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Software safety is a crucial aspect during the development of modern safety-critical systems. Software is
becoming responsible for most of the critical functions of systems. Therefore, the software components in
the systems need to be tested extensively against their safety requirements to ensure a high level of system
safety. However, performing testing exhaustively to test all software behaviours is impossible. Numerous
testing approaches exist. However, they do not directly concern the information derived during the safety
analysis. STPA (Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis) is a unique safety analysis approach based on system
and control theory, and was developed to identify unsafe scenarios of a complex system including software.
In this paper, we present a systematic and semi-automatic testing approach based on STPA to generate
test cases from the STPA safety analysis results to help software and safety engineers to recognize and
reduce the associated software risks. We also provide an open-source safety-based testing tool called STPA
TCGenerator to support the proposed approach. We illustrate the proposed approach with a prototype of a
software of the Adaptive Cruise Control System (ACC) with a stop-and-go function with a Lego-Mindstorms
EV3 robot.
CCS Concepts: •Software and its engineering → Formal software verification; Software safety;
Software testing and debugging;
Additional Key Words and Phrases: safety-critical software, risk-based testing, STPA safety analysis, soft-
ware safety, formal software verification, test case generation
1. INTRODUCTION
Software has become an indispensable part of many modern systems and often per-
forms the main safety-critical functions. Hence, software safety must be analysed in
a system context to gain a comprehensive understanding of the roles of software and
to identify the software-related risks that can cause hazards in the system. Software
safety as stated in [Alberico et al. 1999] is practically concerned with the software
causal factors that are linked to individual hazards and ensured that the mitigation
of each causal factor is traced from software requirements to design, implementation,
and test. A software failure may lead to catastrophic results such as injury or loss of
human life, damaged property or environmental disturbances. Therefore, it becomes
essential to test the software components for unexpected behaviour before using them
in practice [Minister of Defence 1991]. The Toyota Prius, the General Motors airbag
and the loss of the Mars Polar Lander (MPL) mission [JPL 2000] are well-known soft-
ware problems in which the software played an important role in the loss, although
the software had been successfully verified against all functional requirements.
Software testing is a crucial process to assess the quality of the software and de-
termine whether it meets its specified requirements. The term software safety testing
[NASA-GB- 8719.13 2004] was introduced and implies that software testing should
not only address functional requirements, but the software safety requirements as
well. Therefore, the process for testing safety-critical software combines conventional
testing and safety analysis approaches to focus the testing efforts in a specific way
to address the safety of the software and test the critical risky situations. Fault Tree
Analysis (FTA) [Vesely et al. 1981] and Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analy-
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sis (FMECA) [International 1967] are the approaches commonly used for the purpose
of safety-based testing. However, these approaches focus only on single component
failures and they have limitations to cope with complex systems including software.
Leveson [Leveson 2011] noted that the primary safety problem in software-intensive
systems is not software “failure” but the lack of appropriate constraints on software
behaviour. The solution is to identify the required constraints and enforce them in the
software and overall system design. Therefore, a new safety analysis technique called
STPA [Leveson 2011] has been developed to overcome the limitations of the traditional
techniques in addressing the unsafe scenarios of complex systems.
1.1. Problem Statement
The complexity of safety-critical software makes exhaustive software testing impossi-
ble. Therefore, we need to make sure that safety is sufficiently considered. Yet, many
existing testing approaches and tools do not incorporate information from safety anal-
ysis. In case they do, they rely on traditional safety analysis techniques such as FTA
and FMECA which focus on component failures instead of component interactions. A
software safety testing approach integrated with alternative systems-theoretic safety
analysis approaches such as STPA has been missing.
1.2. Research Objective
Our overall goal is to help software developers to more easily and effectively test safety-
critical systems. In this paper, we focus on filling the aforementioned gap by a method
which integrates generating safety-based test cases with the information derived dur-
ing an STPA safety analysis in a systematic and semi-automatic way.
1.3. Contributions
To reach our research objective, we provide five main contributions: (1) We explore
how to apply STPA to safety-critical software. (2) We provide an algorithm based on
STPA to derive unsafe software scenarios and automatically translate them into a
formal specification in LTL (Linear Temporal Logic) [Pnueli 1977] including timing.
(3) We make use of specific STPA features (e.g. process model and the STPA safety
requirements) to systematically derive a safe behavioural model. (4) We provide an
algorithm to extract a safe test model from the safe behavioural model and check its
correctness by automatically transforming it into an SMV representation (Symbolic
Model Verifier) [McMillan 1993] and verify it against the STPA safety requirements
using the NuSMV model checker [Cimatti et al. 1999]. (5) We propose an algorithm
to automatically generate the traceability matrix between the STPA software safety
requirements and the test model and generate the safety-based test cases for each
safety requirement from the test model.
1.4. Terminology
We define the most relevant terms in table I to ensure a consistent terminology in this
paper.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1. STPA Safety Analysis & Software Safety
STPA (Systems-Theoretic Processes Analysis) [Leveson 2011] is a top-down process
based on the accident model called STAMP (Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and
Processes). STPA is developed for generating detailed safety requirements of complex
and modern systems to prevent the occurrence of unsafe scenarios in the systems.
In STPA, the system is seen as a set of interrelated components which interact with
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Table I: Terminology
Terminology Definition
Software Safety is the discipline of software assurance that is a systematic approach to
identifying, analyzing, tracking, mitigating, and controlling software
hazards and hazardous functions (data and commands) to ensure safe
operation within a system [NASA-GB- 8719.13 2004].
Accident Accident (Loss) results from inadequate enforcement of the be-
havioural safety constraints on the process [Leveson 2011].
Hazard Hazard is a system state or set of conditions that, together with a
particular set of worst-case environmental conditions, will lead to an
accident [Leveson 2011].
Unsafe Control Actions The hazardous scenarios which might occur in the system due to pro-
vided or not provided control action when required [Leveson 2011].
Safety Constraints The safety constraints are the safeguards which prevent the system
from leading to losses (accidents) [Leveson 2011].
Process model The process model is a model required to determine the environmental
and system variables and states that affect the safety of the control
actions and it is updated through various forms of feedback. [Leveson
2011] [Thomas 2013a].
Process model variables The process model variables are the safety-critical variables of the
controller in the control structure diagram which have an effect on
the safety of issuing the control actions [Thomas et al. 2012].
Causal Factors Causal factors are the accident scenarios that explain how unsafe con-
trol actions might occur and how safe control actions might not be
followed or executed [Leveson 2011] [Thomas et al. 2012].
Safe Behavioural Model The safe behavioural model is a statechart notation that models the
process model of a software controller in the STPA control structure
diagram and and it is constrained by the STPA-generated software
safety requirements (transition conditions).
Safe Test Model The safe test model is an extended finite state machine model which
is automatically constructed from the safe behavioural model.
Safety-based Test Cases The safety-based test cases are set of the test cases which are gener-
ated from information derived during the safety analysis process.
each other to provide a dynamic equilibrium through feedback loops of information
and control. STPA has the following main steps: (1) Establish the fundamentals of the
analysis (e.g. system-level accidents and the associated hazards) and draw the control
structure diagram of the system (shown in Fig. 1). (2) STPA Step 1: Use the control
structure diagram to identify the potential unsafe control actions. (3) STPA Step 2:
Determine how each potentially unsafe control action could occur by identifying the
process model and its variables for each controller and analysing each path in the
control structure diagram.
The basic components in STPA are safety constraints, unsafe control actions, unsafe
scenarios, control structure diagram and process models. A control structure diagram
is made up of basic feedback control loops. An example is shown in Fig. 1. When put
together, they can be used to model the high-level control structure of a particular
system.
An extended approach to STPA is proposed by Thomas [Thomas 2013b] for identify-
ing the unsafe control actions which are identified in STPA Step 1 based on the com-
binations of process model variables (context tables) of each controller in the control
structure diagram. It also aims at performing STPA STPA 2 based on a set of unsafe
control actions which are identified in of STPA Step 1. Thomas [Thomas 2013b] math-
ematically discussed the formalization of STPA which can be used not only to identify
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Fig. 1: A general feedback control structure of a software system
unsafe control actions and other control flaws, but also to generate model-based re-
quirements that will enforce safe behaviours.
Definition 2.1 (A Control Structure Diagram). The Control Structure Diagram
(CSD) of a software system can be expressed with five-tuples (CO , AC , SO , CP , CA),
where CO is a set (one or more) of the software controllers which control the controlled
processes (CP ) by issuing control actions to the actuators, AC is a set of the actuators
which implement the control actions (CA) of the controller, CP is a set of the controlled
processes which are controlled by controllers (CO). SO is a set of sensors which send
the feedback about the status of the controlled process.
Each controller in the control structure diagram must contain a model of the as-
sumed state of the controlled process, called the process model [Leveson 2011]. A pro-
cess model contains one or more variables, the required relationships among the vari-
ables, the current state and the logic of how the process can change state. This model
is used to determine what control actions are needed. It is updated through various
forms of feedback [Leveson 2011]. The process model is a part of the internal state of
the controller in the control structure diagram.
Definition 2.2 (A Software Controller). A software controller CO i can be expressed
formally as a two-tuple CO i = (CA,PM ), where CA is set of the control actions and
PM is the process model of the controller which has a set of process model variables
(PMV ), which are a set of critical variables P and states S that have an effect on the
safety of CA: P =
⋃
(P1 = v1 . . .Pn = vn), where P1 and Pn are process model variables
of the software controller CO i with their values v1 and vn.
In [Abdulkhaleq et al. 2015], we classified the process model variables of the soft-
ware controller that affect the safety of the critical control actions into three types:
1) Internal variables which change the status of the software controller, 2) Interac-
tion interface variables which receive and store the data/command/feedback from the
other components in the system, and 3) Environmental variables of the environmental
components that interact with or are controlled by the software controller.
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Fig. 2: STPA SwISs approach for software-intensive systems
2.2. STPA SwISs Approach for Software- Intensive Systems
Developing safety-critical software requires a more systematic software and safety en-
gineering process that enables the software and safety engineers to recognize the po-
tential software risks. For this purpose, we proposed a comprehensive software safety
engineering approach based on STPA for Software-Intensive Systems, called STPA
SwISs [Abdulkhaleq et al. 2015] (as shown in Fig. 2). STPA SwISs provides a concept
of deriving the software safety requirements by STPA at the system level, modelling
them as a safe behavioural model and automatically generating test cases from this
model by using an existing model-based tool such as ModelJUnit [Utting and Legeard
2007]. The STPA SwISs approach is carried out in three major steps: 1) Deriving the
software safety requirements at the system level, and generating the unsafe scenarios
based on the extended approach to STPA by Thomas [Thomas 2013b], and expressing
the corresponding safety requirements in formal specifications using LTL; 2) Modeling
STPA results with a safe behavioural model. A safe behavioural model is a UML stat-
echart notation that models the process model variables of a software controller in the
STPA control structure diagram as states and the control actions as the state actions,
and it is constrained by the STPA-generated software safety requirements (transi-
tions); and 3) Generating the safety-based test cases by using an existing model-based
tool.
Our preliminary algorithm [Abdulkhaleq et al. 2015] for deriving test cases from
STPA results relied on using an existing model-based testing tool called ModelJUnit
to drive the test cases. This algorithm is effective in deriving test cases but it has some
limitations: 1) ModelJUnit requires that a behavioural model be written as a Java
class, which represents the finite state machine of the system; 2) The ModelJUnit
tool has not been developed with the purpose of safety-based testing and deriving the
test cases from the safety analysis results; 3) there is no way to verify and check the
correctness of a test input model of ModelJUnit against the safety analysis results;
and 4) The ModelJUnit tool does not provide a traceability matrix between the safety
requirements and the generated test cases.
To support the safety engineering process based on STPA, we developed an ex-
tensible platform called XSTAMPP1 [Abdulkhaleq and Wagner 2015b] which is an
open-source platform written in Java based on the Eclipse Plug-in-Development Envi-
1http://www.xstampp.de
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ronment (PDE) and Rich Client Platform (RCP). XSTAMPP supports performing the
three main steps of STPA and provides an internal representation in XML for each
STPA component to support possible future integration with other tools. STAMPP also
supports the application of the STPA SwISs approach in identifying the unsafe sce-
narios and automatically deriving the corresponding software safety requirements. It
also supports the formal verification activities by automatically expressing the refined
software safety requirements into formal specifications in LTL. As a new extension to
XSTAMPP, we developed an Eclipse plugin called STPA verifier2 to automatically ver-
ify the refined software safety requirements which are expressed in LTL by using the
model checkers (NuSMV and SPIN) in XSTAMPP.
In this paper, we discussed the algorithms to automate some activities of the STPA
SwISs approach which are implemented in XSTAMPP to help the software and safety
engineers in identifying the unsafe scenarios, automatically deriving the correspond-
ing software safety requirements, and automatically expressing the refined software
safety requirements into formal specifications in LTL.
2.3. Software Safety Testing
Software testing is one of the most important phases during the software develop-
ment process to detect inconsistencies between the software implementation and its
requirements. A popular testing approach called Model-based Testing (MBT) [Dalal
et al. 1999; Apfelbaum and Doyle 1997] aims at automatically generating test cases
using models extracted from software requirements. The model-based testing process
involves creating a suitable model of the software’s behaviour based on requirements
or an existing specification to generate the test cases.
A big challenge in software testing is the design of test cases. To generate test cases,
the tester needs first to understand the system specification and requirements. After
that, the tester has to manually write test cases or automatically generate test cases
from a model by using model-based testing tools. Automated generation of test cases
involves that the system behaviour should be modelled in a suitable model. Over the
years, there are many of the automated model-based test case generation approaches
which have been developed by different techniques such as random generation algo-
rithms [Prowell 2003], graph search algorithms [Kuan 1962; Broy et al. 2005], model-
checking [Offutt et al. 2003], symbolic execution [Pretschner 2001] or theorem proving
[Castanet and Rouillard 2002].
Software safety testing [NASA-GB- 8719.13 2004; Lutz 2000] is a crucial process in
developing safety-critical systems to verify whether a software system meets its safety
requirements. Safety-critical software should be tested extensively to ensure that the
potential software-related hazards have been eliminated or controlled to a low level of
risk.
A number of software behaviour models are in use today, several make good models
for testing such as control flow charts [Harel 1987], finite state machines [Mealy 1955;
Gill 1962], SpecTRM-RL [Leveson 2000], and sequence event diagrams [UML 2004]. A
software behaviour can be described as an input sequence, actions, guards and output
logic, or the data flow through the software modules and routines. In the following,
we describe popular software behaviour models which are used to model software be-
haviour and generate test cases from these models:
Finite state machines are commonly used in software behaviour modelling and test-
ing to generate test cases [Apfelbaum and Doyle 1997]. The finite state model (shown
in Fig. 3) includes a set of states, a set of input events and the transition between them.
2http://www.xstampp.de/STPAVerifier.html
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Fig. 3: The finite state machine model
Definition 2.3 (Finite State Machine (FSM) ).
Let f be a finite state machine which can be defined with a 5-tuple [Mealy 1955]:
f = (S, s1, I, O, Ts), where S is a finite nonempty set of states with s1 as the initial
state, I and O are finite input and output alphabets, and Ts is a behaviour relation
which defines all possible transitions of the finite state machine model.
Another software behaviour model is an Extended Finite State Machine (EFSM)
which is an extension of the classical (Mealy) Finite State Machine (FSM) model with
input and output parameters, context variables, operation and guards defined over
context variables and input parameters. EFSM [Cheng and Krishnakumar 1993] is
a common and very useful diagram to model the system behaviour and suitable for
driving the test cases. EFSM contains nodes which represent the states of the system
and the directed arcs which represent the transitions of the system from one state to
another [Utting and Legeard 2007].
Definition 2.4 (Extended Finite State Machine (EFSM)).
Let M be an extended finite state machine which can be defined by the 6-tuple
[Cheng and Krishnakumar 1993]:
M = (Q,
∑
1,
∑
2, I,∨,∧), where Q is a finite set of states,
∑
1 is a finite set of events,
I ⊂ Q is the set of initial states, ∨ is the set of state variables, and ∧ is a finite set of
transitions.
Statecharts [Harel 1987] were developed as a broad extension of the conventional
formalism of finite state machines with notations of hierarchy, concurrency, and com-
munication for describing the behaviour of complex or reactive software systems.
Definition 2.5 (A Statechart). Let SC be a statechart which can be defined with a
7-tuple [Harel 1987]:
SC = (S, s1, λ, ξ, χ,Ω,Σ), where S is a finite set of superstates, s1 ∈ S is as the start
superstate which is a either a state or a state-chart, λ is a transition function that
maps the set of states S, ξ is a superstate function that maps the set of superstates
onto itself, χ is an event function that maps the set of transitions T , S × S to a set of
events, Ω is a finite set of events, and Σ is a default transition function that maps the
set of states S to their default sub-state if it exists, or itself.
In [Harel 1987] Harel defined the statecharts language and the semantics of state-
charts for complex systems. Simply, each Stateflow has a chart which is an indepen-
dent state machine. Each chart has one or more states which are linked together by
arcs labeled with transition information. The states can be also hierarchical states and
contain a number of sub-states (children). Each state should have a type of state de-
composition OR STATE or AND STATE. The OR STATE decomposition allows only
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Fig. 4: The statechart model
one sub-state (which has a default transition) to be active at a time when the parent
(superstate) is active whereas the AND STATE decomposition allows all sub-states to
be active when the parent (superstate) is active.
Based on Harel’s statechart notations, the Simulink Stateflow model was developed
by Mathworks3 to model event-driven (reactive) systems with enabling the representa-
tion of hierarchical state machine diagram, parallelism and history within statechart
diagrams. The Simulink Stateflow is generally used to model the discrete controller in
the model of a hybrid system where the continuous dynamics such as the behaviour of
the plant and environment are specified using others capabilities of Simulink toolkit
[Hamon and Rushby 2007a]. Recently, Matlab/Simulink has become a common model-
based development tool for industrial software systems, which is widely used in vari-
ous industries such as the aircraft, automotive, telecommunications, and transporta-
tion industries.
Figure 4 shows the semantics of the Simulink’s Stateflow model. In Simulink’s State-
flow, each state can be labeled with the following elements:
name <of a state>
entry: <entry actions are executed when a state is entered.>
during: <during actions are executed when while in a state.>
exit: <exit actions are executed when a state is left.>
entry, during, exit: <combined actions in a state>
The Stateflow model in Fig. 4 includes two superstates (state 1 and state 2) with
state decomposition OR STATE. The superstate State 1 has two sub-states with state
decomposition AND STATE. When the superstate State 1 is active, then the both sub-
states will be active in the same time. While the superstate State 2 has two sub-states
with state decomposition OR STATE. That means when the superstate State 2 is ac-
tive, then only the sub-state with the default transition subState 3 will be active.
The semantics of the Stateflow are defined informally in Simulink. Therefore, the
Stateflow model need to be translated into a formal model supported by the verifica-
tion approaches. Two different semantics for the Stateflow were proposed: 1) denota-
tional [Hamon 2005] by Hamon and 2) formal operational [Hamon and Rushby 2007b]
by Haman and Rushby. Therefore, it is important here to note that our proposed algo-
rithm to translate the Stateflow model into an SMV model works only with a subset
of the operational semantics of the Stateflow model. Moreover, our algorithm does not
consider the semantic of join transitions which are allowed in the Stateflow semantics.
3http://www.mathworks.com
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3. RELATED WORK
In the following, we will discuss the related work to our approach.
3.1. Risk-Based Software Testing
There are several software safety test techniques in the literature that combine safety
analysis principles with model-based testing. Most of them use the term “Risk-based
Testing”, which combines risk analysis approaches such as FTA, FMECA or Markov
chains with software testing approaches (e.g. model-based testing) to create a prioriti-
zation criterion for generating test cases.
Redmill [Redmill 2004] explored the benefits of risk-based testing as the basis of
test planning in the software testing process and how to understand the risks of the
system to focus test efforts. He does not show how to generate the test cases from the
risk analysis approach.
Zimmermann et al. [Zimmermann et al. 2009] proposed a refinement-based ap-
proach to the reliability analysis of safety-critical systems. They used statistical testing
as a model-based testing technique and a Markov chain model to model the system un-
der test. They also used FTA and FMECA as risk-based analysis techniques to identify
the critical situations that represent high risk.
Kloos et al. [Kloos et al. 2011] proposed a model-based testing approach which uses
the information derived from FTA in combination with a system model to generate the
risk-based test cases. They used FTA to select, generate and prioritize the test cases.
They derived the test cases from the combination of fault trees and a basic system
behaviour model called the “base model”.
Our approach uses a similar idea of combining a risk analysis approaches with
model-based testing. The main difference is that we employ STPA for safety analy-
sis which is based on system and control theory rather than reliability theory like FTA
and FMEA. STPA copes with the analysis of complex, modern systems and tackles
the dynamic behaviour of the system by treating safety as a control problem. Fur-
thermore, STPA provides an abstract model of the system under analysis called the
safety control structure diagram which views all main interacting components includ-
ing the software components of the system. This allows us to directly construct the
test model from the control structure diagram and constrain its transitions with the
STPA-generated safety requirements.
3.2. Translating Simulink Models into Models Supported by the Verification Approaches
A considerable amount of work has been done on translating Simulink models into
models supported by formal verification approaches. In the following, we will discuss
the most related work:
Banphawatthanarak et al. [Banphawatthanarak et al. 1999] developed a tool called
sf2smv that generates input for the symbolic model checker SMV [McMillan 1993] from
Stateflow models. In our work, we use the same concept for translating Simulink’s
Stateflow into the SMV model. As sf2smv is not available yet, however, it is difficult to
compare it with our approach in detail.
Meenakshi et al. [Meenakshi et al. 2006] discussed the principles of translating
Simulink models into an input language of a suitable model checker and providing re-
verse translation of traces violating requirements into Simulink notation for playback.
They developed a translator from Simulink to the model checker NuSMV [Cimatti
et al. 2000]. The translator takes a Simulink model as input and generates an equiv-
alent NuSMV model. However, this translator is restricted only to discrete Simulink
models and support only the basic blocks of Simulink (e.g. logical block or Selector
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block) that forms the finite state model of a system. Moreover, the translator does not
support the translation of Simulink Stateflow into the input language of NuSMV.
Chen and Dong [Chen and Dong 2006] proposed a systematic approach to translate
Simulink diagrams to Timed Interval Calculus (TIC) [Fidge et al. 1998], a notation
extending Z to support real-time system specification and verification. The translated
TIC specification covers the functional and timing aspects of the Simulink blocks. This
work aims to guarantee the correctness of control systems. However, this work does
not cover Stateflow diagrams.
Chen et al. [Chen et al. 2012] proposed an approach to systematically translate
Stateflow diagrams to into CSP# [Sun et al. 2009a]. They developed a translator which
is integrated inside the PAT model checker [Sun et al. 2009b] to automate the process
with support of different Stateflow features. This work aims to validate the functional
correctness of Stateflow diagrams by detecting the bugs in the Stateflow model. The
properties to be verified are declared in the CSP# model with preprocessor such as
#define. The translation process preservers the execution semantics of Stateflow and
considers advanced Stateflow modelling features such as implicit events and history
junctions.
Ferrante et al. [Ferrante et al. 2012] developed a modified tool called Parallel
NuSMV (PNuSMV) based on NuSMV model checker [Cimatti et al. 2000] that inte-
grates the ManySAT parallel STA solver [Hamadi et al. 2008]. This tool is part of the
formal specification verification framework for the formal verification of Simulink/S-
tateflow models. The tool translates a subset of Simulink blocks (e.g. logical operators
and arithmetic blocks) into the NuSMV meta model. The interesting properties are
expressed as temporal logic to be verified with the PNuSMV tool. However, this work
does not consider translating the Stateflow model into the NuSMV specifications.
In very recent work, Yang et al. [Yang et al. 2016] presented a tool for the translation
of Stateflow models to timed automata to check the correctness of the Stateflow model.
The translated model is used as an input to Uppaal timed automata [Alur 1999]. They
used Uppaal to analyse the timing behaviour of the system and check both safety and
liveness properties of timed automata. We use a similar principle of transforming the
Simulink’s Stateflow model into an intermediate model with consideration of the state
decomposition (AND STATE and OR STATE) and the attached actions (Entry, During
and Exit). The main contribution of their work, however, is an approach to model check
Simulink models which is not our main focus in this paper. Our contribution is to
visualise the STPA process model, which is created during the safety analysis, with the
Stateflow notation and check its correctness against the software safety requirements.
In this way, we ensure that both models contain the same specifications (e.g. names of
states, variables and control actions) before using it for generating test cases.
In conclusion, the existing work provide a great basis for our approach but are dif-
ferent in their focus. They concentrate on model checking Simulink models, not the
integration with safety analysis or testing. To the best of our knowledge, there is no
existing work on constructing the Stateflow diagram based on the information derived
during a safety analysis for test case generation.
3.3. Generating Test Cases from Extended Finite State Machine
Over the years, many approaches have been developed to generate test cases from
statechart diagrams. The idea behind these approaches is to transform the statechart
diagram into an Extended Finite State Machine (EFSM) and generate the test cases
from this model. In the following, we will discuss the most related work:
Ural [Ural 1987] proposed a method to transform the extended finite state machines
into a flow graph and generate test sequences. This method is based on the principles
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of using data flow analysis techniques in software reliability [Fosdick and Osterweil
1976] to trace the flow graph and generate test cases.
Bourhfir et al. [Bourhfir et al. 1997] proposed a unified method for automatic exe-
cutable test case and test sequences generation which combines both control and data
flow testing techniques with control flow criteria (Unique Input Output) and the all-
du paths coverages criterion. Their approach generates only executable test cases for
EFSM-specified systems by using symbolic evaluation techniques.
Kim et al. [Kim et al. 1999] proposed an approach to generate test cases from UML
state diagrams based on the conventional control and data flow analysis. The authors
have first transformed the state diagrams into EFSM with consideration of the hier-
archical and concurrent structure of states (flattened and broadcast) of the UML state
diagrams. Then, the EFSM are transformed into the flow graphs. They applied the
conventional data flow analysis techniques to the resulting flow graph to generate the
test cases. However, they focused only on identifying possible control and data flow
and not the values of input variables.
Hong et al. [Hong et al. 2000] developed a method for the selection of test sequences
from statecharts. The method is based on the STATEMATE semantics of statecharts
by Harel [Harel and Naamad 1996]. The basic idea is to transform the statechart into
an EFSM which contains all the possible runs of the statechart. The authors have
considered the input variables in the EFSM which was generated from the state ma-
chine diagram. The resulting EFSM model will then be transformed into a flow graph
to generate test sequences that cover all associations between definitions and uses of
each variable that appear in the original state machine. The authors used the existing
method of Ural [Ural 1987] to transform the EFSM into a flow graph that models the
flow of both the control and the data in the statechart.
In conclusion, our approach uses a similar principle of generating test cases from the
test model by using graph search algorithms (depth-first search, breadth-first search
and both combined) which are presented in the aforementioned mentioned approaches.
However, we choose different test coverages criterion to generate test cases such as
all states coverage, all transition conditions coverage and the STPA software safety
requirements coverage. However, our approach transforms each state in the safe test
model as an executable Java script function that takes the state variables which are
declared in the state actions (Entry, During, Exit) as parameters and execute their
equations to update their values. The updated values of these variables will be used to
check the transition condition and determine the next state. Moreover, our approach
provides traceability between the software safety requirements and test model and
traceability between the software safety requirements and the generated test cases.
3.4. Generating Test Cases from Simulink Models
Few research has concentrated on the subject of the automatic generation of test cases
from Simulink Stateflow: Zhan and Clark [Zhan and Clark 2008] developed an ap-
proach for automatic testing of Matlab/Simulink models. Their approach is a search-
based test data generation and selection approach. It uses the first search-based ap-
proach to generate test data.
Paˆsaˆranu et al. [Pasareanu et al. 2009] proposed a framework for model-based anal-
ysis and test case generation for flight software of a NASA flight mission based on
the Simulink Stateflow and UML representations. They used Java path finder4 and
symbolic path finder5 to generate test cases from both UML and Simulink/Stateflow
models. The proposed framework is based on the concept of using model checking to
4http://javapathfinder.sourceforge.net
5http://babelfish.arc.nasa.gov/trac/jpf/wiki/projects/jpf-symbc
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generate test cases. The framework takes the models which are created by using dif-
ferent modelling environment and enables their analysis with model checking and test
case generation approaches.
Windisch [Windisch 2009] proposed an automation approach for search-based test-
ing of continuous functional models like Simulink Stateflow models. The method
demonstrates how search-based testing techniques can be applied to a continuous func-
tional model such as Simulink/Stateflow to generate test cases.
Li and Kumar [Li and Kumar 2012] proposed an automatic method for test data gen-
eration for Simulink Stateflow based on its translation to input/output extended finite
automata model. The method involves that the Simulink Stateflow shall translate to
an input/output extended finite automate model. Each path in Input/output extended
finite automate model represents a computation sequence of the Simulink Stateflow
diagram. They implemented the proposed method by using two model checking tech-
niques and constraint solving. The NuSMV model checker is used to map the input/out-
put of the extended finite automata to a finite abstracted transition system modeled
in SMV and generate test cases by checking each path in the I/O of the extended finite
automata against the resultant model.
We differentiate our work here from the aforementioned approaches by automati-
cally generating the safe test model from the Stateflow model which is constructed
from the safety analysis specification. Our approach also shows how to validate the
correctness of the safe test model against the software safety requirements by using
the NuSMV model checker.
4. THE PROPOSED APPROACH
In this section, we propose an automatic safety-based test case generation approach
for deriving test cases directly from the STPA safety analysis results. The proposed
approach follows the main steps of the STPA SwISs approach and provides a high
degree of automation of each step.
We introduce a running example that we will use to illustrate our approach. It is
the software controller of a train door system. Let us assume the software controller
of the train door control system was designed to open and close a door of a train and
monitor the status of the door. The controller works by receiving information about the
position and the status of the door by a sensor. The door controller also receives input
from external sensors about the position of the train and whether an emergency is
happening. Then, the controller issues the door open or close commands. The actuator
will receive these commands and apply mechanical force on the physical door.
Figure 5 shows the main steps of the approach which includes four steps: 1) deriv-
ing the software safety requirements of a software controller by following the STPA
SwISs approach [Abdulkhaleq et al. 2015] and automatically expressing them in LTL,
2) constructing the safe behavioural model of the software controller with the state-
chart notations in Simulink, 3) transforming the safe behavioural model into an input
model of the NuSMV model checker and checking the correctness of the generated
model against the STPA and safety requirements expressed in LTL; and 4) automat-
ically generating a safety-based test model and deriving the safety-based test cases
from this model.
In the following sections, we describe the four major activities of the proposed ap-
proach in more detail.
4.1. Deriving Software Safety Requirements
This step starts by applying STPA to the system specification to identify STPA soft-
ware safety requirements and the potentially unsafe scenarios which the software can
contribute to. The algorithm starts by establishing the fundamentals of analysis by de-
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
A:13
Fig. 5: An overview of the proposed approach
termining the system-level accidents (ACC) and the associated system-level hazards
(HA) which the software can lead to or contribute in. Next, the algorithm demands
that the safety control structure diagram of the system shall be constructed from the
system specifications. The software here is the controller in the control structure dia-
gram.
For our running example of the train door, we can reuse the STPA analysis in
[Thomas and Leveson 2011]. For example, they came up with the accident ACC.1: A
person is injured while the train closed the door. A system-level hazard that can lead
to this accident is, for example, HA.1: Door closed the door while a person is in the
doorway. The control structure diagram of the train door system is shown in Fig. 6).
The control structure diagram includes: 1) software door controller; 2) door actuator;
3) physical door; 4) and door sensor.
For each software controller component in the control diagram, its software safety
requirements can be derived by performing the following steps:
(1) STPA Step 1: Identify unsafe control actions. In this step, the safety analyst will
identify the potentially unsafe software control actions for each software compo-
nent that can lead to one or more of the defined system hazard HA, as follows:
(a) Identify all safety-critical Control Actions (CAs) that can lead to one or more of
the associated hazards (HA). For example, the software controller of the train
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Fig. 6: The control structure diagram of train door system with the safety-critical pro-
cess model variables
door system issues three control actions: open door, close door, stop opening or
closing door.
(b) Evaluate each CA with four general types of hazardous behaviours to identify
the Unsafe Control Actions (UCAs): (a) a control action required for safety is
not provided, (b) an unsafe action is provided, (c) a potentially safe control
action is provided too early, too late or out of sequence and (d) a safe control
action is stopped too soon or continued too long. For example, the control action
CA.1: close door can be unsafe and lead to the hazard H1. It is then UCA1.1:
The software controller closes the door while a person is in the doorway.
(c) Translate the identified UCAs manually into informal textual Software Safety
Requirements (SSR). For example, the corresponding software safety require-
ment of UCA1.1 is SSR1.1: The door software controller must not close the door
while a person or object is in the doorway.
(d) Identify the process model and its variables and include them in the software
controller in the control structure diagram to understand how each UCA could
occur. The process model describes the states of the software controller (only
critical states which are relevant to the safety of the control actions) and their
variables describe the software communication, input and output. Figure 6 al-
ready shows the process model of the software controller. The process model has
four process model variables PMV: 1 state variable S ( S1 = door state) and 3
variables P(P1 =personInDoorway, P2=Train status and P3=Trainposition)
(e) Automatically generate the critical set of combinations of the process model
variables for each control action (CA). Each combination should be evaluated
within two contexts (C1= Providing CA or C2 = Not Providing CA) to deter-
mine whether the control action is hazardous in that context or not. A control
action CA could be considered hazardous in context C if only a combination of
process variables related to CA leads to a system-level hazard H ∈ HA. The
context C1 = Providing CA has three types of sub-contexts: context incorrect-
ness, in which the unsafe control action commanded incorrectly and caused
a hazard (any time), context real-time execution, in which the unsafe control
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action commanded in a wrong timing (too early or too late) or sequence, and
context execution mechanism, in which the unsafe control action commanded
in a wrong mechanism of execution (applied too long or stopped too soon). For
example, the process model variables that have an effect on the safety of pro-
viding or not providing the control action CA1: close door are door state, train
position, person in door and train status. An example of the critical set of com-
binations which can be generated based on the process model variable values
for the close door control action in the context of providing C1 is Cs1 : door state
= open, train position = aligned, a person in doorway = yes and train status =
stop
(2) STPA Step 2: Identify the unsafe software scenarios for each unsafe control action.
Based on the results of STPA Step 1, the safety analyst will identify the unsafe
software scenarios for each unsafe control action UCA as follows:
(a) Identify the potentially unsafe critical combination of unsafe software control
actions and evaluate it to identify the potential unsafe scenarios of the soft-
ware controller that cause accidents. For example, an unsafe scenario which
can be derived from the critical combination CS1 is SC1.1: The door software
controller provided the control action close door while the train is stopped and
train position is aligned, door state is open and a person is in the doorway.
(b) Refine software safety constraints based on the unsafe scenarios of the software
controller. For example, the software safety requirement which can be formu-
lated from the unsafe scenario SC1.1 is SSR1.1: The door software controller
must not provide the close door command while the train is stopped, the train
position is aligned with the platform, the door state is open and a person is in
the doorway
Definition 4.1 (Refined Unsafe Control Action). The refined unsafe control action
(RUCA) is a four-tuple (CA, Cs, C,TC ), where CA is a control action which causes a
hazard H ∈ HA, Cs = ⋃(P1 = v1, . . .Pn = vn) which is a critical set of combinations of
the relevant process model variables PMV of CA, C is a context where providing or not
providing the control action CA is hazardous, and TC is the type of context providing
of control action CA (any time, too early or too late).
To automatically translate each critical combination of process model variables for
each control action CA into the unsafe software scenarios, we set the following rules:
Rule 1: Each refined unsafe control action (RUCA) in the context of Providing (C1)
of a control action CAi can be expressed as:
RUCAi = <CA> provided <TC> is hazardous when <Cs=
⋃
(P1 = v1, . . .Pn =
vn)> occurred.
Rule 2: Each refined unsafe control action (RUCA) in the context of Not Providing
(C2) of a control action CAi can be expressed as:
RUCAi = <CA> Not provided is hazardous when <Cs=
⋃
(P1 = v1, . . .Pn = vn)>
occurred.
By using the rules 1 and 2, we refine the unsafe control actions which are identified
based on the combination set of process model variables. The software safety require-
ments are generated automatically from the refined unsafe control actions. Based on
definition 3, we identify the following rules which are used to automatically generate
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the Refined Software Safety Requirements (RSSR):
Rule 3: Each RUCAi in the context Providing (C1) of control action CAi can be
transformed automatically into a new software safety requirement as follows:
RSSRi = <CA> must Not be Provided <TC> when <Cs=
⋃
(P1 = v1, . . .Pn =
vn)> occurred.
Rule 4: Each RUCAi in the context Not Providing (C2) of control action CAi can
be transformed automatically into a new software safety requirement as follows:
RSSRi = <CA> must be Provided when <Cs=
⋃
(P1 = v1, . . .Pn = vn)> occurred.
4.2. Automatically Formalizing Safety Requirements in Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)
In [Abdulkhaleq and Wagner 2015a], we described an algorithm to formalize the safety
requirements in LTL. Here, we extend it to include software safety requirements that
include timing. By using rules 3 and 4, each refined software safety requirement
RSSRi, which is identified from the refined unsafe control action RUCAi, can be trans-
formed automatically into a formal specification in LTL.
Rule 3 defines three types of software safety requirements, which means that
the control action CAi must not be provided in the type of context TC = any time
, too early or too late when the critical combination Csi of the relevant process
model variable values occurred. Each type of software safety can be transformed
automatically into formal specification by the following rules:
Rule 3.1: Each RSSRi derived from the context of providing control action CAi any
time (without delay) can be automatically transformed into LTL as:
LTLi = G (Csi → ! (controlAction == CAi)), where Csi=
⋃
(P1 = v1 ∧ . . .Pn = vn).
Rule 3.1 means that it always (G) the software controller should not (!) provide a
control action CAi when the values of the critical combination Csi have been occurred.
Rule 3.2: Each RSSRi derived from the context of providing control action CAi too
early can be automatically transformed into LTL as:
LTLi = G (((controlAction == CAi)→ Csi ) & ! ( (controlAction == CAi) U Csi)).
Rule 3.2 means that a software controller should always (G) not provide control ac-
tion CAi before the occurrence of critical combinations set Csi still not become true in
the execution path and that it well provides the CAi when the combination of Csi holds.
Rule 3.3: Each RSSRi derived from the context of providing control action CAi too
late can be automatically transformed into LTL as:
LTLi= G((Csi → (controlAction == CAi)) & !(CsiU(controlAction == CAi))).
Rule 3.3 means that the software controller should always (G) not provide a control
action CAi too late while the occurrences of the critical set of combinations has become
previously true in the execution path.
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Fig. 7: A safe software behavioural model
Rule 4.1 defines one type of the software safety requirements which is the context of
not providing a control action CAi when it is required. This type can be expressed into
LTL by the following rule:
Rule 4.1: Each RSSRi derived from the context of Not providing of control action
CAi can be automatically transformed into LTL as:
LTLi = G (Csi → X(controlAction == CAi)), where Csi=
⋃
(P1 = v1 ∧ . . .Pn = vn).
This rule means that the occurrence of a critical set of combination values always
implies that the software controller must provide the control action CAi at the next
time step (X) without any delay.
For example, the corresponding LTL of the software safety constraint SSR1.1 of the
train door software controller can be specified as follows:
LTL1.1= G (((trainstatus== stop) && (doorstate == close) && (trainposition==
Aligned) && (PersonIndoorway== TRUE))→ ! (controlAction== closedoor)).
4.3. Constructing a Safe Software Behavioural Model
To generate the safety-based test cases, the information derived from the STPA safety
analysis must be integrated into a suitable model which should visualise the process
model variables of each software controller and their relations in a control structure
diagram. For this purpose, we select the Stateflow [MathWorks 2016] diagram nota-
tions to visualise the automation model of each software controller. The Stateflow di-
agram is a visual notation for describing dynamic behaviour, including the hierarchy,
concurrency and communication information. The idea here is to build a model from
STPA results with a modelling editor (e.g. Simulink) that supports the export of the
statechart notations as XML specifications.
Definition 4.2 (Safe Behavioural Model (SBM)). Let SBM be a Safe Behavioural
Model (shown in Fig. 7) which can be expressed by a three-tuple (PMV , T, CA), where
PMV is a set of the safety-critical process model variables: critical variables P and S
states: P ⊂ PMV and states S ⊂ PMV, T is the set of transition conditions which are
extracted from the STPA refined software safety requirements RSSR that are refined
based on PMV, and CA is the set of the critical software control actions.
Each transition Ti of the safe behavioural model is expressed with the syntax Ti
= IE [SSR] / TA, where IE is the input event that causes the transition Ti, SSR is
a safety requirement which is a Boolean condition that constrains the transformation
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Fig. 8: Mapping the process model variables and control actions into the safe software
behavioural model
from the current state to the next state, and TA is an action that will be executed when
the Boolean expression is valid. Each state in the Stateflow model has three optional
types of actions: Entry, During and Exit actions. Entry actions execute when the state
is entered, During actions execute when the state is active, an event occurs and no
valid transition to another state is available, and Exit actions execute when the state
is active and a transition out of the state occurs [MathWorks 2016]. These actions are
used to determine how to change the current state of the software controller to the
next state.
The syntax of the Stateflow in Simulink allows to combine these three actions that
execute the same tasks in a state. To change values of the process model variables
P =
⋃
(P1 = v1 ∧ . . .Pn = vn) in a state, we used these actions of each state in the safe
behavioural model to determine how each value of the process model variable (Pi) can
be changed when the software controller enters or exists or this state. For example,
the process model variable Pi in the process model of the software controller can be
written in a state as an Entry, During or Exit action or combined state actions as
follows: entry, during, exit : Pi = <new value of Pi >.
As the transition condition is derived from the refined STPA software safety con-
straints, the new value of each process model variable will be used to check the tran-
sition condition of the current state to determine what is the next state. We also used
these state actions to determine which control action of the software controller can be
dispatched on entering, during or exiting the current state. Figure 8 shows how to map
the internal process model variables of the software controller and its control actions
into the safe behavioural model. We identify the rules of constructing a safe software
behavioural model from the STPA results as follows:
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Fig. 9: The safe behavioural model of the train door software controller
— The process model of each software controller in the STPA control structure dia-
gram will be visualised by a chart in the Stateflow model. For example, the State-
flow model of the door software controller (as shown in Fig. 9) has one chart which
contains one superstate door state.
— The safe behavioural model should contain all internal states S and the safety-
critical process variables P of the software controller in the STPA control structure
diagram. As shown in figure 9, the door software controller contains one internal
state doorstate which has two substates close and open .
— All process model variables of the software controller in the STPA control struc-
ture diagram should be declared in the safe behavioural model. As an example,
we declared the three process model variables of the train door software controller
as follows: Trainposition (Enum ), Trainstatus (Enum) and the personIndoorway
(Boolean)
— The safe behavioural model should constrain the transitions using the STPA soft-
ware safety requirements (constraints) which are identified based on the rules 3
and 4. For example, the train door software controller must provide the control ac-
tion open door when the train is stopped and aligned with platform. We used this
information to constrain the default transition of the state open.
— Define an enumeration data type variable named controlAction in the safe be-
havioural model which takes all control actions of the software controller in the
STPA control structure diagram as its value. For example, we defined the control
actions of the train door software controller open door, close door and stop as enu-
meration data type in the safe behavioural model.
— The controlAction variable will be used as an entry/during/exit action of internal
states of the safe behavioural model to show which control action will be issued
when the software controller enters or exits a state.
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4.4. Automatically Transforming a Safe Software Behavioural Model into an SMV Model
To check the correctness of the safe behavioural model and ensure that the safe be-
havioural model of the software controller satisfies all STPA software safety require-
ments, the safe behavioural model must be verified against the generated LTL formu-
lae. For this purpose, we developed an algorithm that automatically transforms the
SBM model created in the Simulink editor into an input language of a model checker
such as SMV (Symbolic Model Verifier), automatically parses the LTL formulae from
the STPA data model and includes them into an SMV model. To verify the SMV model
against the STPA software safety requirements, we use the NuSMV model checker. In
case that the SMV model does not satisfy a given LTL of a software safety requirement,
the NuSMV model checker will return a counterexample. A counterexample contains
information that shows why the given LTL formula of a software safety requirement is
not satisfied. Based on the counterexample’s information, the safe behavioural should
be modified. As the LTL formula contains information about the state of software con-
troller si and the control action CA, therefore, the modification of the safe behavioural
model involves changes to the transition conditions or the initial values of the variables
of the state si in which the model violated the given LTL formula. This step continues
until the safe behavioural model satisfies all STPA-generated software safety require-
ments.
The algorithm of generating the SMV model is divided into three sub-algorithms:
1) generate STPA data model which parses XML specifications of the STPA project
created in XSTAMPP (shown in algorithm 1); 2) generate Stateflow (safe behavioural
model) data model which parses XML specifications of a Stateflow model and generate
a tree of Stateflow states (TSf ) in which a node represents one Stateflow state (shown
in algorithm 2); and 3) generate SMV model which transforms the STPA data model
and Stateflow data model into SMV specifications (shown in algorithm 3).
4.4.1. Parsing the STPA project created by XSTAMPP. Algorithm 1 shows the process of
parsing the STPA project created by XSTAMPP. The algorithm process accepts the
STPA project file F as input. Then, it parses the XML specification of the STPA project
into the corresponding data model DataModel which represent all data in an STPA
project (see lines 1− 3). For each software controller in the control structure diagram,
a data model DMSW will be created to store the information about the software con-
troller such as its critical control actions, process model and its variables, software
safety requirements and the generated LTL formulae (see lines 4 − 5). The algorithm
will fetch the information of each software controller and store them in the correspond-
ing lists (see lines 6 − 9) and add these lists into the data model of the software con-
troller (see lines 11− 14). The output of this algorithm is a list of the data model of the
software controllers in the safety control structure diagram (see line 16).
4.4.2. Parsing the Stateflow model created by Simulink/Matlab. Algorithm 2 shows how to
parse the XML specifications of the Stateflow model stored in a Simulink/Matlab file.
The input of this algorithm is an XML file of the Simulink Stateflow file (Sf ) which
contains XML specifications of the Stateflow model.
The structure of the Stateflow model allows a multilevel hierarchy of states in which
a state Si.j can contain sub-states with different types, where i indicates the number of
the level hierarchy of the Stateflow model (i = 0...n), j is the number of states, and n is
the total number of levels in the Stateflow model. Therefore, the process of algorithm
2 traverses recursively the Stateflow data model based on the depth-first search algo-
rithm to consider all sub-states of the superstate and add them to the tree of Stateflow.
Each Stateflow model has two kinds of state decomposition: OR states (exclusive) and
AND states (parallel) [MathWorks 2016]. The Stateflow semantics allow every state to
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Algorithm 1 Generate STPA Data Model
Input: F : A STPA project file
Data:
CAs= a list of control actions,
PMV s= a list of process model variables,
SSRs = a list of software safety requirements, and
LTLs = a list of generated LTL formulae of SSR.
DataModel= a data model which stores all information of STPA project F .
Output: DataModelSW= a list of the data model of the software controller CO ∈ F .
Description:
1: URL schemaFile (“/hazschema.xsd”)
2: XSModel LoadXMLSchema (schemaFile)
3: DataModel ParseXMLSchema (F )
4: for each SWi Controller in DataModel do
5: Create a new data model DMSW for SWi Controller.
6: Fetch: CAs← DataModel.fetchControlActions()
7: Fetch: PMV ← DataModel.fetchProcessModelV ariables()
8: Fetch: SSRs← DataModel.fetchSoftwareSafetyRequirements()
9: Fetch: LTLs← DataModel.fetchLTLs()
10: Add DM SW .CAs← CAs
11: Add DM SW .PMV s← PMV s
12: Add DM SW .SSRs← SSRs
13: Add DM SW .LTLs← LTLs
14: Add DataModelSW [i]← DM SW .
15: end for
16: Return DataModelSW
have a state decomposition that indicates what type of sub-states the superstate can
contain. All sub-states of a superstate Si.j should have the same type of decomposition
of the parent state.
4.4.3. Generating the tree of the Stateflow model. The algorithm for generating the tree
of the Stateflow (shown in algorithms 2 & 3) starts by parsing the XML specifications
of the Simulink’s Stateflow Sf into the data model DM Sf (see lines 1 − 3). A tree
Stateflow will be created to store a root node, a list of transitions and the list of the
Stateflow variables. As a Stateflow model has no root state, a default node called root
will be created to store all information about the superstates at level 0 and assigned
its ParentID randomly as an integer number that is not assigned to any state in the
Stateflow model (see lines 4− 7). Each node stores the following data: id, name, paren-
tID, T a list of transitions, a list of children (sub-states), the order of execution, a list of
the state actions (entry, during and exit actions) and type of decomposition state (OR
State or AND State). All superstates at level 0 in the Stateflow model are added as the
children of the default root node. For each state Si,j , a node will be created to store all
information of the state Si,j (see lines 8− 14). If the state Si,j has children, then all its
sub-states will be traversed recursively until no more children exist for the superstate
(see line 15). Then, a state node will be added as a child of the root node (see line 17).
The transitions at this level will be added to a transition list of the Stateflow tree Tsf
to be used in the next algorithms (see line 21− 23): the SMVGenerator algorithm, Ex-
tended Finite State Machine model (EFSMGenerator) and a truth-table of the EFSM
model generator.
Figure 10 shows the tree of the stateflow model of the train door software controller.
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
A:22
Algorithm 2 Generate a Tree of Stateflow Data
Input: Sf : A Simulink Stateflow file
Data: DM Sf = A data model to store all data of Stateflow in Sf ,
S= A list of states of Stateflow Sf .
Output: TSf= a tree which represents all information of Stateflow states ∈ sf .
Description:
1: URL schemaFile (“/Stateflowschema.xsd”)
2: XSModel LoadXMLSchema (schemaFile)
3: DM Sf ParseXMLSchema (Sf )
4: Extract all states at level 0: S ← DM Sf .Stateflow.getStates()
5: Create a state root node← root
6: Set ParentID root← ParentID /∈ DM Sf .States.IDs
7: Name root← ’root’
8: for each State s in S do
9: Create a state child node←node
10: Set ParentID node.parentID ← root.ID.
11: Set Data node.name← s.name
12: node.Id← s.SSID
13: node.setDecomposition← s.getDecomposition()
14: node.setStatesActions← s.getStatesActions()//Entry, During and Exit Actions
15: if s.hasChildren()==true then
16: node.isHasChildren(true)
17: traverseChildren (node , s )
18: end if
19: Add root.addChild ( node )
20: end for
// Extract all transitions between the states.
21: TSf .setTransitions(DM Sf .getTransitions())
// Extract all variables of Stateflow.
22: TSf .setVariables(DM Sf .getV ariables())
23: TSf .root = root
24: Return TSf
4.4.4. Generating the SMV model from the STPA and Stateflow data models. Figure 11
shows the basic structure of the SMV model as described in [Cavada et al. 2010]. Each
SMV module represents a superstate in the Stateflow model which can contain the fol-
lowing sections: 1) The name of the model with the optional state variable parameters,
2) The declaration of the state variable and their possible values, 3) The initial values
of variables and the states variable, 4) The sub-modules of the super module declara-
tion, 5) The transitions of the module, and a list of the LTL formulae. To represent the
states of the Stateflow model (' internal state variables of each controller in STPA) in
an SMV model, we declare an enumeration variable called ”states” which contains the
names of sub-states of the superstate in the Stateflow model.
Based on the principles of the SMV model [Cavada et al. 2010] and Stateflow di-
agram [MathWorks 2016], we develop an algorithm to transform the Stateflow (safe
behavioural model) and STPA data objects into an SMV model. Algorithm 4 shows the
process of automatically transforming the safe behavioural model and the STPA data
models into an input language of the SMV model checker. The algorithm traverses the
states of the safe behavioural model recursively and generates the SMV model by pars-
ing the hierarchical levels of the safe behavioural model. The inputs of the algorithm
are a tree of Stateflow model TSf which is created based on algorithm 2 and the STPA
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Algorithm 3 traverseChildren(root, s)
Input: root : a root node in the tree TSf , s: a state in a satateflow data model DM Sf
Description:
1: if s.hasChildren()==ture then
2: for each State child in s.getChildren() do
3: Create a new node node
4: Set node.setName← child.getName
5: nodel.setId← child.getID
6: node.setParentID ← child.getParentID
7: node.setDecomposition← child.getDecomposition()
8: node.StatesActions← child.StatesActions()//Entry, During, Exit Actions
9: if child.hasChildren()== ture then
10: node.setHasChildren(true)
11: end if
12: Add root.addChild(node)
13: traverseChildren(node, child)
14: end for
15: end if
Fig. 10: The tree of the stateflow model of the train door software controller
data model DataModelSW of the software controller CO i, which is generated based on
algorithm 1 and a node n in the tree TSf .
The algorithm 4−5 process starts by creating an object of the SMV model which
represents all structure data of the SMV model (see line 1). The algorithm takes the
root node of the safe behavioural model tree as the input at the first time to create the
main module of the SMV model, then it cerate the main module section (see lines 2−6)
and declares the VAR section (see line 7). In this section, the algorithm will declare
the local variables of the root node and maps their data types to the SMV data types
(see lines 8 − 9). The algorithm will check whether the variables are declared exactly
in the process model of the software controller in the STPA control structure diagram
to reduce the time and effort of matching these variables during the verification step
(see line 10). If a name of variable or state in the STPA data model does not match any
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1 MODULE main (<module variables >)
2 VAR
3 variables : <range data type >/<enumeration >
4 <nameSub1 >: _SubModule1 (variables)
5 ...
6 <nameSubN >: _SubModuleN (variables)
7 states: <All children states >
8 ASSIGN
9 INIT (states=<initialState >)
10 INIT (<variable > =<value >)
11 next(<variable >):= case
12 <var1 >=<value > & <tranConditon >:<nextValue >;
13 ...
14 next(states):= case
15 <states >= value & transition:nextState;
16 ...
17 esac;
18 LTLSPEC
19 <List of LTL formulae >
Fig. 11: The structure of the SMV model is generated from the Stateflow tree and the
STPA data object
name in the data model of the safe behavioural model, then the algorithm will show a
message to the user and return null (see line 49).
The SMV model does not support the same basic data types (int, double, single) as
the data types which are declared in the Stateflow model, it supports only a finite
range type as integer range min...max value. Therefore, the algorithm should map
the data types (int, double or single) into a finite range which starts with a minimum
value and ends with a maximum value of integer data type. The enumeration data
types are declared into the Stateflow model as a class which is saved in a separate file
and not in the XML specifications of Stateflow model. Therefore, the algorithm checks
each variable with enumeration data type whether it is a process model variable in the
STPA data model or not. In case the enumeration variable is a process model variable,
the algorithm takes its values as they are defined in the STPA process model variable
values. Otherwise, the algorithm creates an empty bracket {} for the values of the
enumeration variable and prompts the user to determine the values of this variable
(see lines 11− 15).
Next, the algorithm checks whether the root state root has children states and which
of them has children too (see line 16−20). In case that a child node of root has children,
then the algorithm declares a sub-module for this child node. Then, the algorithm takes
all variables of the current state node to create a list of the parameters of the sub- mod-
ule (see line 18). Next, the algorithm parses the sub-states of the superstate and cre-
ates the variable ”states” with a list of the names of the sub-states as values (see lines
21 − 24). The algorithm will create the seciton ”Assign” to initial the states and vari-
ables of the SVM model (see line 15). The algorithm will create the initial expression
of the ”states” variable. Each data variable will also be initialised with the minimum
value of its data type such as a variable with a numeric data type with zero, Boolean
with FALSE and enumeration variable with the first value (see in lines 26− 27). Next,
the algorithm will parse all transitions of the current state node and create the next
expressions for the ”states” variable (see lines 28−34). The next expressions of states
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Algorithm 4 generateSMV(TSf , DataModelSW , n)
Input: TSf : a tree data model of safe behavioural model, DataModelSW : a STPA data
model of controller COi, n: is a node in tree TSf .
Output: SMV i: an SMV object represents the data of SMV model.
Description:
1: Create a SMV i ← SMV model object
2: if (n.isRoot ()==true) then
3: Set header of SMV i ← ’Module main’
4: else
5: SMV i← ’Module’ root.getName() (root.getVariables)
6: end if
7: Set VAR section of SMV i ← ’VAR’
8: Parse Variables SMV i.setV ariables()← TSf .getV ariables()
9: Map data type of SMV variables into SMV data types.
10: if (ValidateSTPADataModel (n.getV araibles(), DataModelSw) then
11: if (v.getType()! = ”Enum”) then
12: Declare each variable as v.getName : v.getType();
13: else
14: v.getName : {}; // an empty bracket
15: end if
16: if (n.isSubModule==true) then
17: for each s ∈ n.getChildren() do
18: Declare ”Sub ” + s.getName(n.getV ariables()) (n.getV ariableNames())
19: end for
20: end if
21: Declare states variable in SMV ← ’states’
22: for each s ∈ n.getChildren() do
23: states← .s.getName()
24: end for
25: Set ASSIGN section of SMV ← ’ASSIGN’
26: initial each v of SMV i ←
27: init(v.getName()) :=initial Value;
28: Parse Transitions T ← n.getTransitions()
29: Set Next section of T of n state
30: SMV i.← ’next’ (states) := case
31: for each t ∈ T do
32: states := t.Source&t.Condition : t.Destination;
33: TRUE: states ; esac
34: end for
35: if (n.isRoot ()==true) then
36: for each v ∈ n.getVariables () do
37: SMV i.← ’next’ (v.getName()) := case
38: states=n.getSource(): n.getEntryDuringExit(v.getFunction())
39: TRUE: v.getName (); esac;
40: end for
41: end if
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Algorithm 5 generateSMV(TSf , DataModelSW , n) (continued)
42: SMV i ← ’esac;’
43: if (n.hasChildren()) then
44: for s ∈ root.getChildren() do
45: SMV i ← generateSMV(TSf , DCsi, s)
46: end for
47: end if
48: else
49: Show ”STPA variables do not match Sf variables” & Set SMV i ← null
50: end if
51: SMV i← ”LTLSPEC ”DCsi.getLTL()
52: Return SMV i.
variable refer to the transition relations of current state node with other states in the
model (the truth-table). The next expressions of the states variable are expressed as
follows:
next ( states ) : = case
states=<sub−state> : <nextstate>
. . .
1 : {All sub−states } ; esac ;
To create the next expressions for each data variable, the algorithm parses the Entry,
During and Exit actions of the current state and extracts all actions of each variable
(see lines 35 − 41). The next expressions of the data variables refer to the values of
variables in the next state. The next expressions of each data variable are expressed
as follows:
next ( variable ) : = case
states = <state> & trans i t ion : <nextValue>
. . . .
The algorithm will continue parsing the superstate in the tree of the safe be-
havioural model (Stateflow) till all superstates have been visited (see lines 43–48).
The generated SMV specifications of each sub-module and the main module will be
saved as a string into a stack object. Finally, the algorithm will fetch the LTL formulae
from the STPA data model object and add them at the end of the main-module section
(see lines 50–51).
To check the correctness of the generated SMV model and the safe behavioural
model, we run the NuSMV model checker to verify whether the SMV model contains
errors and verify it against the STPA software safety requirements expressed in the
LTL formulae and saved to the SMV model.
Figure 12 shows an example of the generated SMV model of the safe behavourial
model of the train door software controller.
4.5. Automatically Constructing the Safe Test Model from the Safe Software Behavioural
Model
After ensuring the correctness of the generated SMV model of the safe behavioural
model (Stateflow model), the safe behavioural model which uses the notations of the
Simulink’s Stateflow should be transformed into the EFSM notation. For this purpose,
we develop an algorithm to map the Stateflow tree of the safe behavioural model and
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1 MODULE Sub_Doorstate (Trainposition ,Trainstatus ,
PersonIndoorway)
2 VAR
3 controlAction :{Opendoor ,Closedoor ,Stop};
4 states: {Open ,Close};
5 ASSIGN
6 init (states):=Open;
7 next (states):=case
8 states=Open & (Trainposition=Aligend & Trainstatus=Stop):
Open;
9 states=Close & (PersonIndoorway) : Open;
10 states=Open & (! PersonIndoorway) : Close;
11 states=Close & (Trainposition=Aligend & Trainstatus=Stop) :
Close;
12 TRUE: {Open ,Close };
13 esac;
14
15 MODULE main
16 VAR
17 PersonIndoorway: boolean;
18 Trainposition: {Aligned , NotAligned}
19 Trainstatus: {Stop , Move}
20 Doorstate :Sub_Doorstate (Trainposition ,Trainstatus ,
PersonIndoorway);
21 states: {Doorstate };
22 ASSIGN
23 init (states):= Doorstate ;
24 init (PersonIndoorway) := FALSE ;
25 next (states):=case
26 TRUE:{ Doorstate };
27 esac;
28 LTLSPEC G ((( trainstatus == stop) & (doorstate == close) & (
trainposition == Aligned) & (PersonIndoorway ==TRUE)) ->
!( controlAction == closedoor))
Fig. 12: An example of the generated SMV model for the train door software controller
its truth-table into an EFSM model. The algorithm 6–7 shows the process of transform-
ing the tree of the Stateflow model into an EFSM model. The idea here is to eliminate
the hierarchical and concurrent structure of the Stateflow model (flattened and broad-
cast communication) and transform them into the EFSM notations by considering the
state decomposition (exclusive or parallel).
The algorithm 6–7 starts by taking the root node of the Stateflow tree TSf as the
root node of the EFSM model and the truth-table of the Stateflow as the truth-table of
the EFSM model (see line 1). The Stateflow semantic supports multi-hierarchy levels
of states, whereas the EFSM model does not. Therefore, the truth-table of the EFSM
model must not have any source or destination node as a superstate (a state that has
children). The idea here is to investigate the truth-table of Stateflow and update the
destination and source parent state with its sub-states. At the beginning, the algo-
rithm checks whether there is a superstate in the truth-table (see lines 2−3). For each
transition t ∈ T in the truth-table, the algorithm will identify its source and destina-
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Algorithm 6 GenerateEFSM (TSf )
Input: TSf : a tree of Stateflow model,
Output: EFSM : a Java object represent all data of EFSM
Description:
1: Create StateNode root← TSf .getRoot()
2: Get TruthTable truthTable← TSf .getTruthTable()
3: if root.hasChildren()==ture then
4: Set Initial state← TSf .getInitialState( )
5: while isHasSuperState(truthTable) do
6: for Transition t ∈ truthTable do
7: StateNode src← t.getSourceNode ()
8: StateNode dest← t.getDestinationNode ()
9: if src.isSuper() & !(dest.isSuper()) then
10: get children← src.getChildren()
11: for child ∈ children do
12: updateTruthTable (child, dest, t, truthTable)
13: end for
14: else
15: if !(src.isSuper()) & dest.isSuper() then
16: if dest.Decomp(’AND STATE’) then
17: get children← dest.getSubSates();
18: for child ∈ children do
19: updateTruthTable (src, child, t, truthTable)
20: end for
21: else
22: if dest.Decomp(’OR STATE’) then
23: SD← getDefaultState(dest)
24: updateTruthTable (src, SD, t, truthTable)
25: end if
26: end if
27: end if
28: if src.isSuper() & dest.isSuper() & dest.Decomp(’OR STATE’)
then
29: get srcChildren← src.getSubSates();
30: get def← dest.getDefaultState();
31: for s ∈ srcchildren do
32: updateTruthTable (s, def, t, truthTable)
33: end for
34: end if
tion states and create two state nodes (see lines 6–8). Next, the algorithm will check
their state decomposition as follows:
— If source state src ∈ Tsf of transition t is a superstate with a state decomposition
“OR STATE” or “AND STATE” and the destination node dest ∈ Tsf is not super-
state. Each sub-state of src state must be linked to the destination state dest by cre-
ating a new transition with the same information of transition T ∈ Tsf .T ruthTable
for each sub-state and only update the source with sub-state (see lines 9− 14).
— If source state src ∈ Tsf is not superstate and the destination state dest ∈ Tsf is
superstate with a state decomposition “AND STATE”. All sub-states of dest state
should be identified and linked with the source state (see line 15 − 21). Algorithm
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Algorithm 7 GenerateEFSM (TSf ) (continued)
35: if src.isSuper() & dest.isSuper() & dest.Decomp(’AND STATE’)
then
36: get srcChildren← src.getSubSates();
37: get destChildren← dest.getSubSates();
38: for s ∈ srcchildren do
39: for d ∈ destchildren do
40: updateTruthTable (s, d, t, truthTable)
41: end for
42: end for
43: else
44: if !(src.isSuper())& !(dest.isSuper()) then
45: updateTruthTable (src, dest, t, truthTable)
46: end if
47: end if
48: end if
49: end for
50: end while
51: end if
52: Add EFSM .setTruthTable← truthTable
53: Add EFSM .setStates← TSf .getStates()
54: Return EFSM .
7 will create a new transition for each sub-state of dest, where source is src and
destination is the sub-state of destination.
— If source state src ∈ Tsf is not superstate and the destination state dest ∈ Tsf is
superstate with a state decomposition “OR STATE”. The default state defaultState
of superstate dest (a default state is a state which has a default transition) should
be identified (see lines 22− 27). Algorithm 7 will create a new transition and set its
source as src and its destination as the default state of destination.
— If source state src ∈ Tsf is superstate with a state decomposition “OR STATE” or
“AND STATE” and the destination state dest ∈ Tsf is superstate with a state de-
composition “OR STATE”. All sub-states of src state should be identified and linked
with a default state of dest state (see lines 28 − 34). Algorithm 7 will create a new
transition for each sub-state of src and its source is src and its destination is the
default state of destination dest state.
— If source state src ∈ Tsf is superstate with a state decomposition “OR STATE”
or “AND STATE” and the destination state dest ∈ Tsf is superstate with a state
decomposition “AND STATE”. All sub-states of src state should be identified and
linked with all sub-states of dest state (see lines 35 − 43). Algorithm 7 will create a
new transition for each sub-state of src and its source is src and its destination is
the sub-state of destination dest state.
— If source state src ∈ Tsf is not superstate and the destination state dest ∈ Tsf is
not superstate. A transition t will be added into the truth-table (see lines 44− 46).
The algorithm runs continuously till no superstate exist in the truth-table. All sub-
states (without children) in the Stateflow model tree will be taken as the states of the
EFSM model. Also, all data variables of the Stateflow model and the actions of the
state (entry, exist, during) will be added into the states of EFSM.
Figure 13 shows an example of the generated EFSM of the train door software con-
troller
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Algorithm 8 UpdateTruthTable (src, dest, t, truthTable)
Input: src : a source node of transition t, dest: a destination node of transition t, t : a
transition in the truth-table, truthTable: a truthTable of Stateflow tree Tsf
Description:
1: create new Transition t new
2: set data t new ← t
3: update t new.setSrc(src)
4: update t new.setDest(dest)
5: add truthTable← t new
Fig. 13: The safe test model (EFSM) of the train door software controller
4.6. Automatically Generating Safety-Based Test Cases
The final step is to generate the test cases from the safe test model (extended finite
state machine) which are constructed from the safe behavioural model.
We developed a random walk-based algorithm for automatic test case generation
from the safe test model. We implemented three search-based algorithms (e.g. depth-
first search, breadth-first search, and both combined depth-breadth-first search). The
idea behind here is to select a state in the safe test model as a start node and transform
into a Java Script function at run time. The Java script function takes the variables
which are declared in the state actions (Entry, during, Exit) of each as parameters and
executes the state actions to update the values of the variables. The return value of the
function will be determined based on the data type of each variable which is declared in
the Simulink Stateflow model. Next, the algorithm will check the transition conditions
of a state to determine which is the next state. During traversing the safe test model,
the information of the visited states (path sequences) will be saved in a test suite.
Generating test cases from a model usually leads to an infinite number of possible
test cases. Therefore, it is necessary to choose a suitable test coverage criteria to man-
age the generating process. In our algorithm, we identify three test coverage criteria:
1) state coverage which is the number of visited states divided by the total number
of the states of the model, 2) transition coverage is the number of the executed tran-
sitions divided by the total number of the transitions, 3) STPA safety requirements
coverage in which each STPA software safety requirement should be covered at least
in one test case to trace how the STPA-generated software safety requirements are
covered into the generated test cases. To measure the STPA SSR coverage, we define
a safety requirements traceability matrix between the generated safe test model and
STPA software safety requirements to manage the quality of the test case generating
process and measure the coverage of STPA software safety requirements in the gen-
erated safety-based test cases. As the safe test model of the safe behavioural model is
constrained with STPA safety requirements (step 2) and contains the process model
variables as states, the algorithm will automatically generate the traceability matrix
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Algorithm 9 Generate Traceability Matrix (SSR, TN , src, minSimilarity)
Input: SSR: a STPA-generated software safety requirement, TN : a transition condi-
tion in a safe test model extracted from SBM . src: a source node of transition condition
Tn.
minSimilarity: a minimum degree of similarity between 5% ... 100%.
Output TM : a traceability matrix. Description:
1: Add TN ← states = src.getName()
2: Add TN ← controlAction = src.getAction().getName()
3: tokenize SSR[]← SSR
4: tokenize TN []← TN
5: get max Tokens← max (SSR[], TN [])
6: inital Sim← 0
7: inital matched Tokens← 0
8: inital i← 0
9: while i < max Tokens do
10: inital j ← 0
11: while j < max Tokens− 1 do
12: if SSR[i] == TN [j] then
13: matched Tokens = matched Tokens+ 1
14: end if
15: j = j + 1
16: end while
17: i = i+ 1
18: end while
19: SimSSR,TN =(matched Tokens / max Tokens) × 100
20: if SimSSR,TN ¿ minSimilarity% then
21: Add TM ← SSR × TN
22: end if
23: Return TM .
(TM = SSR × TN , where SSR ∈ DCs of the STPA data model and TN transition
conditions ∈ TSf ).
Algorithm 9 shows how to generate the traceability matrix TM by calculating the
similarity degree between each STPA-generated software safety requirement(SSR)
and the transitions condition (TN ) of the safe behavioural model and the input state
actions of the source state of transition condition TN . The similarity degree is calcu-
lated by the following equation:
Sim(SSR,TN) =
|#Total No. matched tokens between (SSR, TN)|
|#Max No. tokens in (SSR, TN) | × 100 (1)
Algorithm 9 takes a STPA-generated software safety requirement (SSR), a transi-
tion condition TN , the source state of the transition condition TN and a minimum
degree of similarity (maxSimilarity) which should be between 5% . . . 100% and en-
tered by the user. To compare between the STPA-generated software safety require-
ments and transition conditions, the algorithm construct at first the full transition
information by including the name of source state and the control action which is pro-
vided in this state to the transition condition (shown in Fig. 14). The algorithm creates
the full transition information by adding the source state src and the control action
controlAction to the transition condition TN . The full transition condition will be con-
structed as follows:
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Fig. 14: An example of the similarity degree between STPA safety requirements and
Stateflow transition conditions
fulltransition ← {states==src.getName() and contorlAction==src.getAction() and
src.getTransitionCondition (TN)}
The algorithm calculates the similarity degree based on the equation 1. If the simi-
larity degree is greater than the minimum degree of similarity, then the algorithm will
create an item in the traceability matrix for the software safety requirement SSR and
the transition condition TN . The algorithm also allows the user to set the maximum
similarity degree between 5..100% before generating the safety-based test cases.
Algorithm 10 shows how to generate the test cases from the safe test model. It takes
the generated Safe Test Model (STM ), a Traceability Matrix TM , a list of the test
coverage criteria CC , a number of test steps which is the total number of executions
of the algorithm and a stop condition which is a test coverage criteria to stop the
execution of the algorithm when it reaches 100%. The process of generating the test
cases from the safe test model can be described as follows:
(1) The algorithm starts by selecting a random state as the start state and a state as
the end state from the safe test model to generate all possible paths between them
(see lines 3− 4).
(2) A new test suite ts will be created to store all the generated test cases.
(3) Generate for each input data variable a random value between its minimum and
maximum values which are identified by the user (see line 7).
(4) Walk randomly by using the depth-first algorithm, all possible paths between the
start and end states will be identified. The path here means a sequence of the
visited states and their transitions. We also use the breadth-first algorithm com-
bined with depth-first algorithm to identify all possible paths PT from start state
to achieve a good test coverage criteria (see line 8− 11).
— For each transition t in path pt ∈ PT , its transition condition will be transformed
into a Java Script function. The test input variables in will be passed as an
input of a Java Script function. To execute this function at the run time, we use
the Java Script Engine which invokes the function with values of input data
parameters and returns the result.
— For each state s in path pt, the state actions (Entry, During, Exit) will be elim-
inated and transformed into Java Script functions. These will be executed to
update the values of each local loc or output variable out of each state.
— Create a new test case tc. Each test case will store the information about the se-
quence path pt such as: id is a number of the test case, id Ts which is the number
of the test suite, id SSR which is the number of the software safety requirement,
preconditions and actions which is the sequence of the local variables of states in
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Algorithm 10 Generate Safety-based Test Cases(STM , TM ,CC, TestSteps,
StopConiditon)
Input: STM : a safe test model extracted from SBM , TM : a traceability matrix, CC:
is a list of the test coverage criteria, TestSteps is the total number of execution algo-
rithms, StopCondition: a condition to stop the execution process.
Output TS: a list of test suites, each test suite should contain a list one test case TC.
Description:
1: Initial step← 0
2: while step < TestSteps do
3: Choose start state← STM.getRandomState()
4: Choose end state← STM.getRandomState()
5: Create a new test suite ts
6: if StopConiditon < 100.0% then
7: Randomly Generate Tes InputData ()
8: Walk TC i ← GenerateTestCasesByDFS (start, end)
9: Add ts← TC i
10: Walk TC j ← GenerateTestCasesByBFS (start)
11: Add ts← TC j
12: else
13: if StopConiditon==100.0% then
14: Calculate Coverage Criteria()
15: STOP
16: end if
17: end if
18: ADD TS ← ts
19: Calculate Coverage Criteria()
20: unvisitedTransitions(STM)
21: unvisitedStates(STM)
22: Initial step← step + 1
23: end while
24: Return TS.
the path pt and their updated values, and postconditions which is the sequence
of output variables and their values.
(5) Check whether the test case tc has been covered in any test suite. If it hasn’t, tc
will be added to the test suite ts (see line 13).
(6) Calculate the test coverage criteria and check the stop condition of the algorithm
(see line 14).
(7) Change status of all states and transitions in the safe test model to unvisited to
generate a new sequence path (see line 20− 21).
(8) The algorithm will be continued (repeat 1-8) till the stop condition is achieved
(100%) or the number of executions the algorithm has been reached to the total
number of the test steps.
Ultimately, the time spent during test case generation process, the values of the test
coverage criteria and a list of test suits and their test cases with the related software
safety requirements will be automatically saved into a CSV file.
5. TOOL SUPPORT
Here we describe the implementation of the proposed approach for generating test
cases based on the information derived from the STPA safety analysis. We use the
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Fig. 15: STPA TCGenerator: STPA test cases generator tool
previous algorithms and rules as the basis for implementing tool support for our safety-
based test case generation approach.
To automatically formalize the STPA software safety requirements which are docu-
mented in XSTAMPP and transformed into LTL based on rules 1−4, we developed an
Eclipse plug-in called XSTPA6 based on the XSTAMPP architecture. XSTPA automat-
ically generates the context tables (combinations between process model variables) by
using a Java library for the combinatorial testing algorithm called ACTS7 [Kuhn et al.
2013] which was developed by the American National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology to generate combination sets of t parameters with n values. Based on rules 3
and 4, XSTPA automatically generates the LTL formulae. The generated LTL formulae
will be used to check the correctness of the constructed safe test model which will be
used to generate the safety-based test cases for each STPA-generated software safety
requirement.
To generate the test cases based on STPA results, we implemented a tool support
called STPA Test Cases Generator (STPA TCGenerator, shown in Fig. 15) which parses
the STPA file project created in XSTAMPP and the safe behavourial model which is
created with Simulink’s Stateflow editor to generate the SMV model and check the
correctness of the safe beahvioural model, eliminate the safe test model and generate
safety-based test cases. In the following, we summarise the main functions of the STPA
TCGenerator:
— Parse the STPA data model which is documented in XML specification into Java
objects.
— Parse the XML specification of the Simulink Stateflow model into Java objects.
— Based on the STPA data model and the Simulink Stateflow model, the tool automat-
ically generates the SVM model.
6http://www.iste.uni-stuttgart.de/se/werkzeuge/xstpa.html
7http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/acts/index.html
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— Check the consistency between the STPA data model and the specification of
Simulink Stateflow and provides the results to the user (e.g. matched, does not
match, and unknown).
— Verify the generated SMV model against the generated LTL of the STPA safety
requirements.
— Transform the Simulink Stateflow model into the extended finite state model for
testing purposes.
— Generate the tractability matrix between STPA safety requirements and the
Simulink Stateflow specifications.
— Allow the user to enter the test input data for each input variable.
— Allow the user to configure the test case generation process by adding a number of
test steps and selecting the test case generation algorithm and the test coverages.
To support software and safety engineers who use the XSTAMPP platform, we de-
veloped an Eclipse plug-in for the STPA TCGenerator tool called STPA TCGenerator-
Plugin which is integrated into the XSTAMPP platform to generate the test cases for
each STPA software safety requirement within the XSTAMPP platform.
The first prototype of the STPA TCGenerator standalone version and the results of
the illustrative example are available online in our repository8. The updatesite of the
STPA TCGeneratorPlugin are available online in our repository 9.
6. AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE: A SIMULATOR OF THE ACC SYSTEM WITH STOP AND GO
FUNCTION
To illustrate the proposed approach, we developed a simulator software written in
ANSI-C to simulate the adaptive cruise control system with stop and go function by
using two LEGO EV3 Mindstorm robots10. The simulator was developed by a bachelor
student within 6 months. The ACC with stop and go function [Venhovens and Naab
2000] is an extended version of the normal adaptive cruise control system. It maintains
a certain speed and keeps a safe distance from the vehicle ahead based on the radar
sensors. The ACC with stop and go function will bring the vehicle to a complete stop
when the vehicle ahead comes to a standstill or there is a stationary object in the lane.
Figure 16 shows the mechanism of the simulator of the ACC with stop-and-go func-
tion. The ACC simulator maintains a constant time gap to vehicles ahead. It uses a
forward ultrasonic sensor with a range of up to 255 centimeters, which is located in the
front of the robot to detect the distance of the robot ahead of it and can automatically
maintain the pre-set time gap. It adjusts the robot speed by increasing or decreasing
the value of current speed to keep a safe distance. If the robot ahead is completely
stopped, then the ACC simulator will slow down the robot vehicle to a standstill. If the
vehicle ahead starts moving again, then the ACC simulator will automatically start to
move again and maintain a constant time gap between the robot ahead. Our simulator
algorithm is the ACC simulator starts first read the distance data from the ultrasonic
sensor and then computes the time gap by using the following equation:
currentT imegap = |Frontdistance
CurrentSpeed
| (2)
Second, the simulator computes the standstill time, which is the time at which the
ACC vehicle must decrease the speed or stop when the vehicle ahead is close or fully
8https://sourceforge.net/projects/stpastgenerator/.
9https://sourceforge.net/projects/stpatcgeneratorplugin/
10http://www.iste.uni-stuttgart.de/se/forschung/werkzeuge/acc-simulator/
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
A:36
Fig. 16: A mechanism of the simulator of ACC with Stop and Go function
Fig. 17: The ACC system with a Stop and Go function scenarios
stopped. It is calculated as
∆Timegap = stillstandtime+
√
currentT imegap (3)
Third, the simulator will compare the value of the time gap with the following scenar-
ios (shown in Fig. 17):
— TimeGap > (∆TimeGap + safeTimeGap). This indicates that the vehicle ahead is so
far from the point tσ. The simulator will accelerate the speed of the vehicle robot till
the desired speed. The simulator adjusts (increase/decrease) the current speed by
using the following equation:
currentSpeed+ /− =
√
speed2 + 2 ∗ (Time), (4)
where Time = ((∆Timegap+ safeT imeGap)− TimeGap)
— (TimeGap > safeTimeGap) && (timeGap < (∆TimeGap + safeTimeGap)). This in-
dicates that the vehicle robot ahead is approaching within the period of time gap
between [tσ tsafeT imeGap]. The simulator will put the ACC system in follow mode.
Follow mode means that there is a vehicle in front in the lane. The simulator will
automatically adjust the current speed by using equation 3.
— TimeGap == safeTimeGap. This indicates that the vehicle robot ahead is approach-
ing within the desired time gap and there is a safety distance between them. The
simulator will put the ACC system in the cruise mode. Cruise mode means that the
vehicle robot ahead is approaching in safe time gap. Then, the simulator will set the
current speed as the desired speed.
— TimeGap< safeTimeGap. This indicates that the vehicle ahead is moving within the
time between [tsafeT imeGap t0]. The simulator will reduce the speed of the vehicle by
using equation 3.
— TimeGap == 0. This indicates that the vehicle ahead has fully stopped. Then the
simulator will bring the vehicle to a complete stop at the standstill distance and
change the ACC mode to stop. If the front vehicle starts to move again, then the
simulator will change the ACC mode to resume. Resume mode means that the cur-
rent speed of the ACC vehicle will be accelerated to the desired speed. The simulator
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Fig. 18: The control structure diagram of ACC with the safety-critical process model
variables
uses the following equation to achieve that:
currentSpeed+ = accelerationratio, (5)
where accelerationratio is set to 4 cm/sec;
6.1. Deriving Software Safety Requirements of the ACC Simulator
To derive the software safety requirements, we applied the STPA SwISs Step 1 to the
system specification requirements. We used the XSTAMPP software tool to document
the results of STPA and generate the formal specification of the STPA results.
As a result, we identified the system-level accidents that the simulator software can
lead (or contribute to). For example, ACC-1 : The ACC robot crashes the robot
ahead. The system-level hazards which can lead to this accident are:
—H1: The ACC software does not keep a safe distance from the a vehicle robot ahead.
—H2: The ACC software provides an unintended acceleration when the vehicle in front
is too close.
—H3: The ACC software does not stop the vehicle when the vehicle ahead is fully
stopped.
We built the control structure diagram of the ACC simulator (shown in Fig. 18). It
contains the main interconnecting components of the ACC simulator at a high level,
such as the ACC simulator software controller unit, the electronic motors, the robot ve-
hicle as the controlled process, and the Ultrasonic and speed sensors. The ACC software
controller receives the distance data from the ultrasonic sensor and current speed data
from the speed sensor. Based on this information, the software will calculate the time
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Table II: Examples of potentially unsafe control actions of the ACC software controller
Control
Action
Not providing
causes hazard
Providing causes
hazard
Wrong timing
or order causes
hazard
Stopped too soon
or Applied too long
Accelerate
Speed
The ACC soft-
ware does not
accelerate the
speed when the
robot vehicle
ahead is so far
in the lane. [Not
Hazardous]
UCA-1.1: The ACC
software accelerates the
speed of robot unin-
tendedly when the time
gap to the robot vehicle
ahead is smaller than
the desired time gap.
[H-1] [H−2]
UCA-1.2: The
ACC software
accelerates the
speed before the
robot vehicle
ahead starts
to move again.
[H-1] [H-2]
UCA-1.3: The
ACC software
accelerates the
speed too long so
that it exceeds the
desired speed of
the robot. [H-2]
Decelerate
Speed
UCA-1.5: The
ACC software
does not decel-
erate the speed
when the robot
vehicle ahead is
too close in the
lane. [H-1]
The ACC software decel-
erates the speed of robot
unintendedly when the
time gap to the robot
vehicle ahead is larger
than desired time gap.
[Not Hazardous]
The ACC soft-
ware decelerates
the speed when
the robot ve-
hicle ahead
starts to move
again. [Not
Hazardous]
UCA-1.6: The
ACC software
decelerates the
speed long enough
so that it cannot
bring the robot to
fully stop when
the robot ahead is
stopped. [H-3]
FullyStop UCA-1.4: The
ACC software
does not bring
the robot to a
complete stop
at a standstill
when the robot
vehicle ahead
is fully stopped.
[H-1, H-3]
The ACC software stops
the robot suddenly when
the distance to the robot
ahead is too far. [Not
Hazardous]
The ACC soft-
ware does not
accelerate the
speed after
the robot ve-
hicle ahead
starts to move
again. [Not
Hazardous]
N/A
Table III: Examples of software safety requirements at the system level
Related UCAs Corresponding Safety Constraints
UCA-1.1 SSR1.1- ACC software must not accelerate the speed of the robot when the target robot
vehicle is too close in the lane.
UCA-1.2 SSR1.2- ACC software must not accelerate the speed when the robot ahead is fully
stopped.
UCA-1.3 SSR1.3-ACC software must not increase the speed than the desired speed.
UCA-1.4 SSR1.4-ACC controller must stop the robot at standstill point (shown in Fig. 17) when
the robot ahead is fully stopped.
gap and determine if the vehicle robot ahead is present. The ACC software will adjust
the speed of the robot based on the above sensors and issues one of the critical safety
control action: accelerate, decelerate, or fullystop. Each one of these control actions will
be evaluated based on the four general hazardous types (columns of table II). Table II
shows the examples of the potential unsafe control actions of the ACC simulator.
We evaluated each item in table II to check whether it can contribute or lead to
any system-level hazards (H1− H3). If an item is hazardous, then we assign one or
more system-level hazards to it. We translate each hazardous item manually to the
corresponding software safety requirement by using the guide words, e.g., have to,
must be, or should. Table III shows examples of the informal textual software safety
requirements.
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Table IV: Examples of the context table of providing the control action accelerate
Control
Actions
Process Model Variables Is it a haz-
ardous Control
Action?
CurrentSpeed TimeGap ACC Mode providing
accelerate
CS> minSpeed TimeGap<( ∆ Timegap + safe-
tyTimeGap)
follow No
CS<=desiredSpeed TimeGap == 0 follow Yes, H2, H1
CS<desiredSpeed TimeGap >safetyTimeGap follow No
CS<desiredSpeed TimeGap < (∆ TimeGap +
safetyTimeGap)
follow Yes
Table V: Examples of unsafe software scenarios in XSTAMPP based on critical
combinations
ID Unsafe software safety scenarios
RUCA-1.1 The ACC software controller provides the accelerate command when ACC mode is
Standby and timeGap is greater than (deltaX + safetyTimeGap) and the current speed is
less than desired speed.
RUCA-1.2 The ACC software controller provides the accelerate command when timeGap is less than
(deltaX +TimeGap).
RUCA-1.3 The ACC software controller provides the accelerate command when current speed is
greater than or equal to desired speed.
RUCA-1.4 The ACC software controller does not provide the fullyStop command when the timeGap
is 0.
RUCA2.1 The ACC software controller provides the decelerate command too late when ACC mode is
follow and timeGap is less than safetyTimeGap and currentSpeed is greater than desired
speed.
To refine the informal textual software safety requirements which are shown in ta-
ble III, we identified the process model of the ACC software controller and its critical
variables which have an effect on the safety of the ACC software control actions. Fig-
ure 18 shows the control structure diagram and process model variables of the ACC
software. The ACC software has three safety-critical process model variables: Internal
variables such as currentSpeed (5 values), Timegap (5 values), Internal states vari-
able such as ACC mode (states) with 5 values, and the environmental variables such
as front distance. Each safety control action provided by the ACC software should be
evaluated to determine whether it will be hazardous or not when the combination set
of relevant values of the process model variables (context) occur.
We used XSTAMPP to generate the critical combinations (context tables) for each
safety-critical action in the two contexts when the control action is provided and it is
not provided and causes hazard. For each control action, the total number of combi-
nations between the process model variables is (5 × 5 × 5 =125) combinations. We
reduced the number of combinations by applying pairwise test coverage to the gener-
ated combination sets. The number of critical combinations is reduced to 25 for each
control action.
Based on the generated combination sets, we evaluated each control action in two
contexts Providing and Not Providing. Table IV shows examples of the context table of
providing the control action accelerate based on the combinations of the values of the
critical process model variables. As a result, we identified 32 unsafe scenarios (shown
in Table V) for all the control actions accelerate (18 scenarios), decelerate (7 scenarios )
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Table VI: Examples of generated software safety requirements in XSTAMPP for the
unsafe scenarios
Related UCAs Refined Safety Constraints
RUCA-1.1 RSSR1.1- Accelerate command must not be provided when ACC mode is Standby and
timeGap is greater than (deltaX + safetyTimeGap) and the current speed is less than
desired speed.
RUCA-1.2 RSSR1.2- Accelerate command must not be provided when timeGap is less than (deltaX
+TimeGap).
RUCA-1.3 RSSR1.3-Accelerate command must not be provided when current speed is greater than
or equal to desired speed.
RUCA-1.4 RSSR1.4-FullyStop command must provided when the timeGap is 0.
RUCA-2.1 RSSR2.1- Decelerate command must not be provided too late when ACC mode is follow
and timeGap is less than safetyTimeGap and currentSpeed is greater than desired speed.
Table VII: Examples of LTL formulae of the refined software safety requirements at
the system level
Refined SSRs Corresponding LTL formula
RSSR1.1 LTL1.1- G ((state=Standby) && (timeGap > deltaX+safetyTimeGap) &&
(currenSpeed<desiredSpeed) -> ! (controlAction==Accelerate)).
RSSR1.2 LTL1.2- G((currentSpeed > desiredSpeed ) && (TimeGap <(deltaTime + safety-
TimeGap)) − >! (controlAction==Accelerate).
RSSR1.3 LTL1.3-G((currentSpeed >=desiredSpeed) − >! (ControlAction==stop) .
RSSR1.4 LTL1.4- G((timeGap == 0) − >X (controlAction==FullyStop).
RSSR2.1 LTL.2.1- G ((state==Follow) && (timeGap <safetyTimeGap) && (currentSpeed >=
desiredSpeed) − > !(controlAction==Decelerate))
and FullyStop (7 scenarios). Table VI shows the examples of generated software safety
requriements for the unsafe scenarios.
6.1.1. Formalizing the Software Safety Requirements of the ACC Software Simulator. We for-
malised the STPA-generated software safety requirements of the ACC software sim-
ulator which are derived in Step 1 of the proposed approach (shown in Table VI). We
used XSTAMPP to automatically refine the informal textual software safety require-
ments into formal textual software safety requirements (shown in Table VI). Based
on the rules 3-4, XSTAMPP automatically generates the LTL formula for each refined
software safety requirement. Table VII shows the examples of the corresponding LTL
formula of each software safety requirement. We used the generated-LTL formulae to
verify the safe behavioural model which is constructed from the STPA results.
6.2. Automatically Generating SMV Model
We visualised the process model of the ACC software controller (shown in Fig. 18) by
createding a Simulink/Matlab Stateflow model (shown in Fig. 19). The Stateflow con-
tains 9 states (2 of them are superstates) and 19 transitions. It shows the relationship
between the process model variables in the safety control structure diagram of the
ACC simulator. The process model describes the critical variables and states of the
software and how the software issues the critical safety control actions (e.g. accelerate,
decelerate, etc.)
We generated the SMV model of the safe behavioural model (shown in Fig. 18) by
using the STPA TCGenerator tool which transforms the safe behvioural model into a
verification input of the NuSVM model checker. For that, we first derived the XML
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Fig. 19: The safe behavioural model of the ACC software controller
specifications of the Simulink’s Stateflow model. Second, we took the XML specifica-
tions of both ACC simulator STPA file and the safe behavioural model as input to the
STPA TCGenerator tool. The tool parses both files and generates the SMV model which
maps all states, transitions and data variables, and LTL formulae of STPA software
safety requirements of the safe behavioural model to SMV model specifications.
We updated the default values of each input data variable which are declared in the
generated SMV model (e.g. initial speed (10.0), desired speed (45.0), initial frontdis-
tance (150.0)). The value of current speed will be calculated by using equations 5. The
value of time gap will also be calculated by using equation 2. The STPA TCGenerator
tool runs the NuSMV 2.6.0 model checking tool to verify the generated SMV model
file. The NuSMV model succeeded in verifying the generated SMV model within 0.29
seconds and no further errors were reported. NuSMV consumed 42.10 megabytes to
store 2.31828e+17 states and performed 2.97418e+09 transitions. As a result, all LTL
formulae were satisfied and there is no counterexample generated because the safe
behavioural model itself was built from STPA software safety requirements.
6.3. Safety-based Test Case Generation from the Safe Test Model
After validating the correctness of the safe behavioural model, we used the STPA TC-
Generator to generate a hierarchical tree of the safe behavioural model which shows
the hierarchy levels of the safe test model. The STPA TCGenerator tool parses the tree
of the safe behavioural model recursively by considering superstate decompositions
AND STATE (parallel) and OR STATE (exclusive) to generate the safe test model as
an extended finite state machine. As a result, the generated safe test model contains
7 states (after removing the superstates) and 32 transitions (after maintaining the
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Table VIII: The safety-based test cases generated by STPA TCGenerator tool
ID Test Al-
gorithm
Test
Steps
Test
Suite
Test
Cases
Time (in
Sec)
State Cov-
erage
Transition
Coverage
STPA SRR
Coverage
1 DFS 10 1 119 3 6/7 = 85.7% 23/32=71.9% 32/32=100%
2 BFS 10 4 24 1 6/7 = 85.7% 17/32= 53.1% 32/32=100%
3 Both 10 5 249 2 7/7 = 100% 18/32= 87.5% 32/32=100%
transitions of superstates). The tool automatically generates the traceability matrix
between STPA software safety requirements and the safe behavioural model.
To generate the safety-based test cases from the safe test model of the ACC simula-
tor, we first set the number of test steps to 10 and selected the three test coverage crite-
ria (state, transition and STPA software safety requirements test coverage criteria) in
the STPA TCGenerator tool. We selected the STPA software safety requirements cov-
erage as the stop condition of the test case generating algorithm. We also set the test
input value for each input data variable: power (true), desired speed (45 cm/sec), initial
speed (10 cm/sec), front distance (150 cm). Finally, we ran the STPA TCGenerator tool
three times to generate safety-based test cases from the test model, respectively: 1)
depth-first search, 2) breadth-first search and 3) the combined algorithm. Table VIII
shows the results of the generated safety-based test cases by each test algorithm. We
could achieve 100% coverage of all the STPA software safe requirements which are
linked to the safe test model in the traceability matrix. Figure 20 shows an example of
the format of documenting each safety-based test case.
1 [ Test Case ID] 2
2 [ Test Suite ID] 2
3 [ Related STPA SSRs]
4 RSSR1.1 , RSSR1.2 , RSSR1.3
5 [ PreConditons ]
6 desiredspeed =45.0
7 frontdistance =120.32
8 currentspeed =44.0
9 state=Resume
10 [ Actions ]
11 controlAct ion=Accelerate
12 [ PostConditons ]
13 currentSpeed =45.0
14 state=Cruise
15 [Comment]
Fig. 20: An example of a generated safety-based test case
Based on the traceability matrix between the model and the STPA software safety
requirements, the STPA TCGenerator provides an individual coverage (how many test
cases TC covered each SSR) by each test algorithm (shown in Fig. 21).
7. DISCUSSION
The idea behind the proposed approach is to integrate STPA safety analysis and its
identification of the hazardous situations that the software can lead or contribute to
semi-automatically with software testing. For this, we formalise the STPA software
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Fig. 21: The total number of test cases for each STPA software safety requirement
safety requirements into a formal specification and model the information derived from
the STPA safety analysis into a test model. That helps us to focus the effort of testing
by generating safety-based test cases for each software safety requirements. However,
there are still some open issues and interesting challenges that require further re-
search.
7.1. Visualisation of Process Model
The process model in the STPA control structure diagram is a very abstract model
which shows only the safety-critical variables and states which have an effect on the
safety of issuing the control actions by a software controller in the control structure di-
agram. It does not show how the software controller issues the control actions. There-
fore, we use the statechart notation to visualise the relationships of the process model
variables and describe the safe behavioural model. However, constructing a safe be-
havioural model from the STPA safety results by safety test engineers depends on
the level of information which is available during the STPA safety analysis process
(e.g. process model, and process model variables and values). Moreover, it is critical
how this information describes the internal state of the software controller and the
safety-critical software variables (e.g. interaction and environmental variables). Fur-
thermore, visualising the safe behavioural model in a modelling tool such as Simulink
requires user expertise in the modelling of dynamic behaviour to map the safety anal-
ysis specifications (process model, control actions and software safety constraints) into
the Stateflow notation. Therefore, this point remains as future work to automatically
provide a basic structure of the safe behavioural model from the process model infor-
mation (e.g. states and its hierarchical levels) which is visualised in XSTAMPP. This
will help the safety tester to understand the relationships between the critical system
states, environmental and interaction variables which are documented in the process
model of the software controller in the STPA control structure diagram.
7.2. The Correctness of the Safe Test Model
The manual construction of test cases is a hard, time-consuming and error-prone activ-
ity that requires deep knowledge and expertise. Furthermore, the manual building of
a test model from system specifications with the purpose of generating test cases still
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needs a proof of its correctness to ensure that the test model captures all specifications.
A solution is to construct a test model for a given system and prove its correctness by
transforming it into an intermediate model which is supported by a formal verification
approach (e.g. model checker) to verify the generated model against its specifications.
In addition, the specifications should also be mapped from informal text to the for-
mal specifications. For this issue, we transformed the safe test model into the SMV
model and verified it by using the NuSMV model checker to ensure that the safe test
model satisfies the STPA specifications. However, the model transformation process
also needs a proof of the correctness of the resultant model, even though the model
checker did not induct any error. In our proposed approach, this issue remains as an
open issue for future work.
7.3. Traceability Matrix
The automation of the test case generation process can lead to a large number of test
cases that cover the same information. Reducing the number of generated test cases
is a major factor in evaluating the effectiveness of an automated testing tool and the
quality of the generated test cases. Therefore, we added a new test coverage criteria
(STPA software safety requirements) to stop the test case generating algorithm when
this criterion becomes 100% to ensure that each STPA safety requirement is covered at
least in one test case. Furthermore, the first prototype of the STPA TCGenerator tool
supports to generate test cases for each software safety requirement by automatically
generating a traceability matrix by calculating the similarity degree of the matched
tokens between the STPA software safety requirements and the safe test model. The
traceability matrix contains all relevant transitions of each software safety require-
ment in the safe test model.
7.4. Process Model Variables Data Types
Another limitation is that the process model variables in the STPA control structure
diagram visualised by XSTAMPP have no data types. Furthermore, XSTAMPP does
not support multi-levels hierarchies of the process model of the software controller in
the control structures. That makes ensuring and checking the consistency between the
hierarchy levels of the process model in STPA and the Stateflow model in Simulink a
big challenge. For example, the process model variable ACC Active in the ACC software
controller has sub-process model variables such as control speed and FrontDistance-
sensor which will be activated when the ACC state is active. Therefore, it requires
human effort to define the process model hierarchy and map it to the Simulink State-
flow model hierarchy level.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced a systematic and semi-automatic approach to generate
safety-based test cases based on the STPA safety analysis. Our approach concentrates
on generating a set of test cases for each STPA software safety requirement. The gener-
ated test cases will be used to verify the safety of the software-intensive system under
analysis. We also implemented an open-source tool support that automates the safety-
based test cases generating approach. Furthermore, we illustrated the proposed ap-
proach with safety-critical software of an ACC system with stop-and-go function. The
results show that deriving test cases based on the safety requirements is a practical
and effective approach to generate different test cases to recognize software risks and
assure the software quality.
As a future work, there are many interesting directions and trends to extend the
research of safety-based testing for software-intensive systems and the automated tool
support. We plan to improve the tool by considering the other Stateflow semantics
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which were not addressed in our approach such as inner transitions and connective
and history junctions. Furthermore, we aim to limit the number of the generated test
cases, to improve the traceability matrix by adding information about the maximum
number of test cases for each software safety requirement and also the priority value
to generate a reasonable test case for each software safety requirement.
Furthermore, we plan to improve the process model in the control structure diagram
by allowing the safety analyst to define the data type of each process model variable
and draw the multi-hierarchy levels of the process model variables. Finally, we plan
to evaluate the proposed approach and the tool support on a real software-intensive
system with an industrial partner.
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